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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the effects of introducing explicitly
abatement capital in a welfare function which depends on waste stock
and consumption. Consumption is assumed to produce an undesider-
able residue. Society can control waste accumulation using abate-
ment capital. We focus on two issues: the intertemporal relationship
between abatement investment and waste emission, and the effects
of permanent and temporary environmental policies on the long-run
equilibrium of the economic-ecological system. We get three main
results. First, for a society the problems of waste control and abate-
ment investment are very interrelated. Any change in investment af-
fects waste emission and consumption, but not always in a predictable
manner. Second, we show that the adoption of either temporary subsi-
dies or taxes do not change the long-run properties of the economy. It
is not just current subsidies or taxes, but their entire path over time
that affects accumulation of waste and capital. Third, we get that
environmental policies may have ambiguous effects: in response to
subsidies or taxes a society might accumulate less abatement capital
than desidered, allowing the stock of waste to rise in the long run.
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1 Introduction
In Polluted Golden Age Brock (1977) contended that economists generally
tend to overlook the process of waste accumulation associated with eco-
nomic activities. He remarked that waste product accumulates over time
and provides disutility to society. Abatement investment can be done to
control waste emissions and productivity, but it takes a long time to be
made (Plourde, 1972; Smulders and Gradus, 1996; Pindyck, 2000; Färe et
al., 2007). Finally, corrective taxes and subsidies can be used to control waste
emissions, but different environmental policies may have different impacts on
waste emissions, abatement investment and welfare over time (Perman et al.,
2003; Dinda, 2004; Xepapadeas, 2005).
In what follows, we will think over these issues. Our aim is to scrutinize
the timing and persistence of environmental policies to assess their relative
desirability in terms of environmental quality and social welfare. A special
attention will be devoted to study the effects of environmental policies on
abatement investment decisions.
As said above, the issue of waste control is not new in the economic de-
bate. Seminal papers are Smith (1972), Plourde (1972) and Forster (1973)
which employ optimal control techniques to study the intertemporal effects
of waste stock externality. Later on, a number of studies (Forster, 1975;
Dasgupta, 1982; Weitzman, 1976; Solow, 1986; Hartwick, 1990; Bovenberg
and Smulders, 1995; Smulders and Gradus, 1996; Dasgupta and Maler, 2000;
van der Ploeg and Withagen, 1991; Withagen, 1995; Brock and Starrett,
2003; Travaglini, 2012b) have investigated the effect of waste accumulation
on growth to amend the Solow (1956) and Ramsey model (1928). The com-
mon denominator of these papers is that waste is a by-product of economic
activity, so that growth and environmental protection could be compati-
ble only under certain restrictive conditions (Xepapadeas 2005; Travaglini
2012a).
A further remarkable line of research is based on cost-benefit analysis
(Pearce and Nash, 1981; Hanley and Spash, 1993; Schulze, 1994). In its
most updated formulation, it is concerned with the optimal timing of a dis-
crete policy that a society should adopt to reduce waste emissions (Pindyck,
2000, 2002). Uncertainty about future, externality of waste, and irreversibil-
ity of investments and policies are the central elements of this class of models.
Real option is the more appropriate methodology to study the optimal tim-
ing problem of environmental policies with uncertainty and irreversibility
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(Pindyck, 2002; Lin et al., 2007; Ansar and Spark, 2009; Lin and Huang,
2010, 2011). An interesting application is in Saltari and Travaglini (2011a,
2011b). They shift the attention from the net social benefits to the net
private benefits gained from green firms which invest in abatement capital.
Specifically, they show that the “private view” may explain why environ-
mental policies, promoted to stimulate protective investment, can sometimes
generate unexpected allocation of resource, reducing, instead of increasing,
abatement capital stock over time.
The present paper improves on the current literature in several dimen-
sions. As far as we know, this is the first attempt to introduce both abatement
capital and waste stock in a social utility function. We study the relation-
ship between abatement investment and waste control. Using this innovative
view, we analyze the intertemporal choices of a society concerning the tim-
ing and impacts of taxes and subsidies on waste emissions and abatement
investments. In addition, we will study the characteristics of environmental
policies to be either permanent or temporary, focusing on their capabilities
of affecting the long-run equilibrium of the economy.
Basically, we combine the two previous cited strands of research in one
unique coherent framework. On the one hand, we have the society which
needs to control waste emissions to improve welfare. On the other hand,
we have the firms which invest in abatement capital, looking at costs and
revenues. Here, we try to merge together these two approaches. Therefore,
we will assume that abatement investment is an argument of the welfare
function. Welfare is negatively affected by waste accumulation, while it is
positively affected by abatement capital and consumption. But consumption
generates an undesiderable residue.
For even the basic framework presented here, one is concerned not only
with the optimal waste emission, but also with the optimal rate of abatement
investment. The two planes are strictly interrelated and the combined in-
tertemporal problem is complex. From a technical point of view, when there
are two state variables — such as waste and capital stock — the maximum
principle continues to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for an optimum; and if all functional forms and other restrictions are fully
specified we could provide an explicit solution to the problem. As we will
show, the recursive structure of our problem provides, under specific condi-
tions an explicit solution, and a general qualitative solution as well. This is
a step forward with respect to the previous literature on waste accumulation
where, in presence of two state variables and constraints, it is very difficult to
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find either an explicit or an implicit solution with waste stock and resource
constraints (as it is in Smith, 1972).
The model has a basic structure. Society can control waste emission using
abatement capital, corrective taxes and subsidies. In making investment
society will, however, incur in an additional cost whose magnitude varies
positively with the investment ratio. This additional cost is modelled by
a convex quadratic function. Because of pressure on natural resources this
increasing cost function explicitly takes into account the society’s external
obstacles to investment.
We get three main results. Firstly, for a society the problems of con-
sumption control, waste control and optimal abatement investment are in-
terrelated. Any change in protective investment affects waste emission and
consumption, but not always in a predictable manner. Secondly, we show
that the adoption of either temporary subsidies to stimulate investment, or
temporary taxes to discipline polluters do not change the long-run equilib-
rium of the economy. Indeed, it is not just current subsidies or taxes, but
their entire path over time that affect investment decisions and waste ac-
cumulation. Thus, expectations about how long the environmental policies
would last have a special role in affecting investment decisions and waste
accumulation. Finally, environmental policies may have ambiguous effects:
in response to subsidies or taxes a society might accumulate less abatement
capital than desidered, allowing the stock of waste to rise in the long run.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present
the model. We then study the dynamic properties of the model using phase
diagrams. Next, we study the effects of permanent and temporary environ-
mental policies on both abatement investment and waste accumulation. The
last section concludes.
2 The model
Following Plourde (1972), Smith (1972) and Forster (1973, 1975) consider a
society consuming some good and which, as a by product of this consumption,
increases the stock of waste. Let’s indicate the social utility function as
u(Ct, At,Mt) (1)
where Ct is consumption (a “good”), At is stock of abatement capital (a
“good”), Mt is stock of waste (a “bad”). We assume that uC , uA > 0 and
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uM < 0 and uCC , uAA < 0 and uMM > 0.
To produce consumption goods and abatement investments society uses,
in any activity i = C,E an homogeneous environmental resource X i, such as
land, water or energy, so that
X = XC
t
+XEt +
ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2
(2)
is the total endowment of this environmental input. Equation (2) includes
adjustment costs ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2
as an additional term. In fact, natural resource
should be thought of as gross input. Adjustment costs make a claim on this
gross input, and the net-adjustment-cost input is the gross input X minus
the adjustment cost, that isX− ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2
. The quadratic component ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2
is the additional cost (convex) of abatement investment measured in units
of X. This component captures the external and internal obstacles (such as
pressure on natural resource X) the community faces in adjusting its stock
of abatement capital in the short-run.
Waste M accumulates according to
dM
dt
= It − vMt (3)
that is, the stock M is increased by the waste flow It and it is decreased
by the natural biological decay vM. The undesiderable residue It arises from
aggregate consumption Ct, but it can decrease by some abatement activities,
e.g. a recycling process.
Society can perform any or all of two activies: the production of consump-
tion goods and the production of abatement goods to process waste residue.
Basically, we assume that society produces the amount of consumption goods
Ct according to the production function
Ct = hX
C
t
, h > 0 (4)
Then, as in Clarke and Reed (1994), the gross stock of waste It accumulates
at a rate
It = hX
C
t
− (X −XCt ), (5)
and the net accumulated rate is
dM
dt
= hXC
t
− (X −XCt )− vMt (6)
5
where X is the constant bulk of resource available at any time, and X −XCt
is the amount of the natural resource assigned to abatement activities.
It is convenient to write the dynamics of the abatement stock At, chosen
by the society, as
dA
dt
= XEt − δAt (7)
where XEt is the gross defensive investment per unit time, and δ is the de-
preciation rate of At.
As time periods are linked together through the stock-flow relationships,
efficient abatement activities and waste targets must be derived from an
intertemporal analysis. We proceed assuming that the society aims at max-
imize discounted social net utility over some suitable time horizon. The
dynamic optimization problem can be stated as follows: select values for
the control variables XC
t
and XEt for t = 0, . . . ,∞ so as to maximize the
functional
W =
∫ ∞
0
u(C,At,Mt)e
−ρtdt (8)
where ρ is the constant social discount rate subjects to
dM
dt
≡ M˙ = It − vMt (9)
dA
dt
≡ A˙ = XEt − δAt (10)
It = hX
C
t
− (X −XC)− vMt (11)
X = XC
t
+XEt +
ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2
(12)
Finally, associated with each state variables there is a shadow price λt for the
waste stock Mt and ψt for the abatement stock At. The auxiliary variable µ
is the Lagrangean multiplier of the constraint (12).
This problem is particularly simple to illustrate when the utility function
is additively separable (Plourde, 1972; Smith, 1972). Therefore, to find a
closed form solution we assume that
u(Ct, At,Mt) = u(Ct) + u(At) + u(Mt) ≡ a
(
XC
t
)α
+ bAβ − gMγ
with 0 < α, β, γ < 1 to assure convergence.
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2.1 Optimality
The current valued Hamiltonian takes the form
H =
{ [
a
(
XC
t
)α
+ bAβ − gMγ
]
+ λt
(
hXC
t
− (X −XC)− vMt
)
+
+ψt
(
XEt − δAt
) } e−ρt
(13)
and the Lagrangean is
L=
{ [
a
(
XC
t
)α
+ bAβ − gMγ
]
+ λt
(
hXC
t
− (X −XC)− vMt
)
+
+ψt
(
XEt − δAt
)
+ µ
[
X −XC
t
−XEt −
ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2] } e−ρt
(14)
The transversality conditions are
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλtMt = 0 and lim
t→∞
e−ρtψtAt = 0
Ignoring time subscripts, the optimal solution must satisfy the following con-
ditions in terms of the Lagrangean
LXC = 0 : aα
(
XC
)α−1
+ λ(1 + h)− µ = 0 (15)
⇒ XC =
[
µ− λ(1 + h)
aα
] 1
α−1
(16)
LXE = 0 : ψ − µ
(
1 + ǫXE
)
= 0 (17)
⇒ XE =
1
ǫ
[
ψ
µ
− 1
]
(18)
with
µ  0 X−XC
t
−XEt −
ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2
 0 and µ
[
X −XC
t
−XEt −
ǫ
2
(
XEt
)2]
= 0
(19)
−LA + ρψ = ψ˙ : −bβA
β−1 + δψ + ρψ = ψ˙ (20)
=⇒ ψ = bβ
Aβ−1
ρ+ δ
+
1
ρ+ δ
ψ˙ (21)
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−LM + ρλ = λ˙ : gγM
γ−1 + vλ+ ρλ = λ˙ (22)
=⇒ λ = −gγ
Mγ−1
ρ+ v
+
1
ρ+ v
λ˙ (23)
Because X is constant by assumption one expects that µ > 0 is indipendent
of time.
2.2 Properties of the optimal conditions
Equation (15) states that in each period the efficient consumption will be
one in which the marginal utility of consumption must be equal to the total
price of consumption. µ is the implicit (fixed) rental price of the resources
employed to produce consumption goods, while λ(1 + h) is the unit shadow
social cost of the waste stock. Thus, condition (15) states that a marginal
unit of consumption must equal its marginal social cost.
Equation (18) is a variant of the familiar marginal condition for efficiency.
It states that for a society the optimal abatement investment depends on the
cost c = 1 of an additional unit of abatement resourse and its adjusted
real marginal value ψ
µ
of an additional unit of investment. Putting q ≡ ψ
µ
,
equation (18) becomes
XE =
1
ǫ
[q − 1] (24)
A society finds optimal to support abatement activities when q > 1. Note
that for a society, in presence of waste, the q value captures the trade-off
between abatement activities and polluting consumption. Indeed, the real q
value of a unit of abatement goods is reduced by the shadow value µ of the
resource X. It is worthwhile to remark that investing in protective capital
is convenient for a society when the social shadow value q is bigger than the
trigger value 1; disinvesting is optimal in the opposite case.
2.3 Properties of optimal paths of shadow values
2.3.1 Waste accumulation
To complete the analysis of waste accumulation, let’s focus on equation (23).
It describes how the shadow price λ of accumulated waste moves along the
efficient path. λ equals the present value of the loss of welfare arising from
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the impact of a marginal unit of waste plus the present value of its variation.
Dividing both sides by λ we get
ρ+ v = −gγ
Mγ−1
λ
+
λ˙
λ
(25)
which states that the social cost of waste −gγM
γ−1
λ
+ λ˙
λ
must be equal to its
user cost, ρ + v. In other words, since ρ+ v > 0 the sign of the shadow price
λ must be negative, λ < 0. This result reflects the disutility of M.
To further understand this result, consider a society that bears M = 1
units of waste. Recall that the shadow value of waste is λ, and consider the
society’s choice between decreasing the waste and continuing to endure it.
The social real cost of waste is −gγMγ−1λ per unit time. On the other hand,
the stock of waste provides three distinct cash flows to the society. First,
maintaining the stock of waste society gives up the gains it would receive if
it reduces the waste and enjoy the social proceeds. This has a social cost of ρλ
per unit time. Second, the waste is decreasing by natural decay so the society
losses vλ per unit time keeping its stock constant over time. And third, the
shadow value of waste may be changing over time. It reduces the social
proceeds if the social cost of waste is rising and it rises the social return if its
value is decreasing. This variation has a cost of −λ˙ per unit time. Putting
these three components together, −γgMγ−1λ = ρλ + vλ − λ˙, yields the
previous social user cost of waste. Note that if ρ+v ≶ −gγM
γ−1
λ
+ λ˙
λ
— that is
if the social user cost of waste is smaller (greater) than the marginal disutility
of waste plus its cost change — a society can find it optimal to increase
(decrease) the waste stock. In steady state we have λ = −gγM
γ−1
ρ+v
, that is
the shadow price of waste equals the discounted value of social disutility.
2.3.2 Abatement capital
Finally, equation (21) provides the motion of the marginal value of abatement
capital A. Now, this equation can be re-expressed using the identity q ≡ ψ
µ
,
which implies ψ ≡ qµ and ψ˙ ≡ q˙µ. Therefore, equation (21) can be rewritten
as
q =
bβAβ−1
µ (ρ+ δ)
+
1
ρ+ δ
q˙ (26)
Intuitively, condition (26) states that for a society the internalization of the
cost of waste affects directly the social q value of the abatement capital by
9
the shadow price µ.
It is remarkable that the condition governing the optimal programme
of abatement investment with waste emission should be so simple in form.
In particular, condition (26) makes the role of q very clear. The marginal
social value q of the abatement investment is equal to the discounted gross
value of the marginal utility arising from an additional unit of investment,
bβAβ−1, plus the discounted value of its capital gain q˙. Thus, one important
implication of our model is that even in a polluted environment the marginal q
value captures all information relevant to the society’s abatement investment
decision.
As we have seen, a society will decide to increase its stock of abatement
capital if q is higher than its social cost 1, and to reduce it if q is lower
than 1. In other words, society does not need to know anything about the
future other than the information that is summarized in q in order to make
its decision. The long run equilibrium value of q can therefore be expressed
as
q∗ =
1
µ
∫ ∞
0
bβA
β−1
t e
−(ρ+δ)tdt (27)
which states that q is the present social value of an additional unit of abate-
ment capital. In this perspective, the q ratio says that what is relevant for
a society to invest in defensive capital is the net value of its marginal utility
with respect to A.
3 Analyzing the model
Our solution provides two dynamic conditions, (23) and (26) describing how
the shadow values q and λmove together over time. The dynamics of the sys-
tem presents certain technical difficulties because there are two state variables
(the abatement capital and the stock of waste). However, these equations
have a recursive structure. The differential equation for q does not depend on
M , but the differential equation forM in (31) depends indirectly on XE and
q. Hence, we employ a two steps procedure: we begin our analysis studying
the intertemporal behavior of A and q; afterwards, we will proceed to solve
the system for M and λ.
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3.1 Dynamics and steady state
We start scrutinizing the dynamic properties of the system (26) and (10)
using a phase diagram. We are looking at the following two differential
equations {
q˙ = q (ρ+ δ)− 1
µ
bβA
β−1
t
A˙ = 1
ǫ
(q − 1)− δAt
(28)
The general solution for q of the system (28) is
qt = C1e
κ1t + C2e
κ2t +
1
µ
∫ ∞
0
bβA
β−1
t e
−(ρ+δ)tdt (29)
where κ1 > 0 and κ2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation obtained
by (28). Therefore, we have to set C1 = 0 in order to avoid speculative
bubbles, and to reach the stable arm converging to the steady state
q∗ =
1
µ
∫ ∞
0
bβA
β−1
t e
−(ρ+δ)tdt =
bβAβ−1
µ (ρ+ δ)
(30)
This is of course only to be expected. In addition, since, the derivative of
q with respect to A is negative qA < 0 because β < 1, the demarcation
curve q˙ = 0 has a negative slope. This curve delineates the subset of points
in the space (A, q) where the variable in question are stationary, decreasing
or increasing. Points off the demarcation curve are very much involved in
dynamic motion. Accordingly, on the right of q˙ = 0 we find that q > bβA
β−1
µ(ρ+δ)
,
implying q˙ > 0 is positive. The positive sign of q˙ means that the marginal
shadow value of abatement capital rises. Similarly, on the left of the locus
q˙ = 0 the sign of the variation is negative, q˙ < 0 and the marginal value of
the abatement capital decreases. Hence, going from south to north in figure
(1) the sign sequence of q˙ is (−, 0,+). The arrows in the phase diagram
summarize this information.
For completeness, note, however, that, equation (30) does not provide
an explicit solution for q∗ because the term on the right hand side of this
equation depends on future value of A. But, the future stock of abatement
capital depends on the future q value, which is the unknown we are looking
for. Thus, condition (30) provides a qualitative solution which captures the
intertemporal relationship between q and A. Anyway, if β = 1 the marginal
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A A* 
q* 
q 
0=A&  
0=q&  
Figure 1: The saddle path of abatement investment
contribution of A would be constant over time, and condition (30) would
provide the explicit solution for q.
A similar reasoning allows to draw the steady state for A and the demar-
cation line A˙ = 0. Along the locus A˙ = 0 the gross investment XE is equal
to the depreciation rate δA. The equilibrium value of the abatement capital
is A∗ = 1
δ·ǫ
[q∗ − 1] .
To determine the slope of the locus A˙ = 0 note the first addendum on
the right hand side of the second equation in the system (28) is an increasing
function of q, since an higher q implies an higher investment per unit of time.
Nonetheless, the effect on A˙ of an higher value of A is ambiguous. It is
negative for the second addendum δA, but it is potentially positive for the
first addendum. We assume that this positive effect dominates the first one,
that is the locus A˙ = 0 has a positive inclination. Thus, when q exceeds the
level that yields A˙ = 0, we find that 1
ǫ
(q − 1) > δAt and A is rising. On
the other hand, when q is less than this level we find that 1
ǫ
(q − 1) < δAt
and A is falling. Therefore, going from west to east the sign sequence of A˙
is (+, 0,−). The arrows in the phase diagram show the direction of motion
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of A.
3.2 Optimal abatement capital
Figure (1) combines the demarcation lines. The diagram shows how A and
q must behave to satisfy the system (28). If q > q∗
|A˙=0
, the society tends to
increase its abatement capital, thus A˙ > 0. But, since A is high and marginal
utility is therefore low, q can be high only if it is expected to rise; thus q˙ is also
positive. Hence, A and q move up to the right in the diagram. Obviously, this
is a divergent trajectory which drives the economy far away from the steady
state SS. Specifically, for a given level of A there is a unique level of q that
produces a stable path. If q starts below this level the economy eventually
crosses into the region where K and q are both falling. Similarly, if q starts
too high the economy eventually moves into the region where both K and
q are rising indefinitely. Thus, the unique equilibrium is for q to equal the
value that puts the economy on the saddle path and then moving along this
saddle path to SS. This saddle path is shown in figure 1. The steady state
is characterized by A˙ = 0 and q˙ = 0. Therefore, given the other parameters,
society has not incentive to change its abatement capital stock.
3.3 Optimal waste accumulation
Equation (9), (11) and (23) determine the value of M and λ, and the mo-
tion of the system in the phase space (M,λ) is governed by the differential
equations {
M˙ = I(q∗)− vM
λ˙ = (ρ+ v)λ+ gγMγ−1
(31)
Figure 2 illustrates the demarcation line of the points M = I(q
∗)
v
, such that
M˙ = 0. Along this locus, the net emission of waste is just balanced by the
rate at which waste is degraded by nature, so that accumulation is zero. In
addition, since the demarcation line M˙ = 0 depend on λ, this locus will be
increasing. At any point above of this locus, the stock of waste will increase
since Mv < I(q∗). But, at any point below this locus the decay of waste
is higher than its net aﬄuence I(q∗), and the stock of waste will decrease.
Therefore, going from west to east the sign sequence of M˙ is (+, 0,−). The
arrows in the phase diagram show the direction of motion of M .
13
 
0 M 
λ  
0=M&  
0=λ&  
SS 
Figure 2: The saddle path of waste accumulation
14
In figure 2 it is illustrated the demarcation line λ = −gγM
γ−1
(ρ+v)
, defined by
λ˙ = 0, where the shadow social cost of waste is stationary. At any point
on the right of this locus the discounted marginal disutility of the stock of
waste, −gγM
γ−1
(ρ+v)
, exceeds the shadow social cost −λ associated with the stock
of waste, and optimality requires that this cost will be decreasing, −λ˙ < 0.
Then, at any point to the left of this locus, optimality necessitates increasing
the social cost for waste emission. Hence, going from south to north in figure
2 the sign sequence of −λ˙ is (−, 0,+). The arrows in the phase diagram
summarize this information. An optimal path, starting at some initial state
(M,λ) and converging to the steady state SS in shown in figure 2.
4 Environmental policies
The model developed in the previous sections can be used to address many
issues of environmental policies. This section examines its implications for
the effects on changes in subsidies and taxes. In this setup, the subsidy s
is a rebate which rises the marginal value of an additional unit of capital
A. We suppose that the subsidy s is financed through the corrective taxes
on waste whose value is λ. In fact, the costate variable λ can be seen as a
Pigouvian tax on waste emission. This matter is examined deeply in the next
section. It is, however, evident that there are several points at which either
an environmental subsidy or a tax could be applied. This choice depends
on waste targets. In what follows we assume that the subsidy s affects the
marginal value of the abatement capital, while λ is a tax on emissions.
4.1 The effects of subsidies
By now, notice that when there is a subsidy s of this form, the (social) q
value can be written as
q∗ =
b+ s
µ
βAβ−1
(ρ+ δ)
Therefore, a rise of s will increase the social profit and stimulate society to
enlarge the stock of abatement capital. The rise of s shifts the q˙ = 0 locus up,
moving the economy to a new long run equilibrium. Since rents are higher,
for a given capital stock A, smaller capital gains are needed to be willing to
demand additional units of abatement capital. From our analysis of phase
15
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Figure 3: The effect of a permanent subsidy
diagrams, we know the effect of a higher subsidy: q jumps immediately on
the new saddle path for a given capital stock. Then, A and q move down the
path to the new steady state.
4.1.1 A permanent subsidy
Assume that the subsidy is permanent. Such a change shifts both the locus
q˙ = 0 and A˙ = 0. In fact, along the q˙ = 0 locus we have that q∗ = b+s
µ
βAβ−1
(ρ+δ)
.
This implies that the derivative of q with respect to s is positive. Therefore,
q rises when s rises. Similarly, along the locus A˙ = 0 the effect of an increase
in s is given by As =
1
δǫ
qs > 0, so that the effect of a change of s on A
is positive. Let’s focus on the case qs > As. The phase diagram, therefore,
looks as the one drawn in figure 3.
Figure 3 states that initially (t < t0) society is doing replacement invest-
ment just sufficient to maintain its abatement capital stock Ass0 . Following
the rise in s the marginal q value and the corresponding rate of investment
rises instantaneously to a new higher level, causing the society’s abatement
capital stock to gradually rise to the new steady state level Ass1 . But, the
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Figure 4: The effect of a subsidy on q and A
only path which leads to the new steady state, with no future jumps in q, is
the new stable path. Therefore, q jumps instantaneously to q0 and thereafter
moves down the stable path. The time paths of q and abatement capital
stock A therefore look like the ones drawn in figure (4).
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. A permanent subsidy
s raises the abatement capital stock chosen by the society. However, in the
short run since the abatement capital stock A cannot be adjusted instan-
taneously because the additional social cost c, existing capital earns rents
and so its shadow value q rises strongly. The higher shadow value stimu-
lates society to invest enlarging the abatement capital stock. But, given the
assumption of decreasing marginal utility of A, the q value decreases over
time until the shadow marginal value of the capital reaches the new long run
equilibrium qSS1 .
It is remarkable that initially the q0 value and the associated investment
jump overshooting the new long run equilibrium levels and then gradually
fall to converge to the steady state. This happens because intertemporal
optimality requires that at the time t0 the dynamics of the system (28) must
be on the saddle path in order to converge towards the steady state without
discontinuity. Indeed, if the dynamics of q were discontinuous, it would
be impossible to define q˙, neither the investment equation or condition (21).
Finally. it is worthwhile to note that, as the example of a permanent subsidy s
shows, abatement investment is higher when s has recently rises than when it
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has been low for an extended period. This impact of the change in subsidy on
the level of abatement investment can be labelled as accelerator mechanism.
4.1.2 A temporary subsidy
Now consider an increase in subsidy that is known to be temporary. This
case is illustrated in 5 where s rises in the short run, but eventually will lead
back to its initial level (say s = 0). Assume that the economy begins at time
t0 in the steady state SS0. After the subsidy increase, there is an unexpected
upward shift of the marginal q; but then the economy anticipates that q will
return to its initial level at some later time T. The key insight needed to find
the effect of this change is that there cannot be an anticipated jump in q.
Therefore, at time T , both the variables A and q must be on the saddle path
leading back to the initial long-run equilibrium: if they were not, q would
have to jump to get back to its long-run equilibrium. But q is a continuos
function and cannot jump between t0 and T.
Together these facts tell us how the society responds to the temporary
subsidy. At time t0, q jumps immediately to the point B such that, given
the initial capital, q and A reach the old saddle path at exactly time T. This
is shown in 5 where q jumps from point SS0 to point A at the time t0 when
the subsidy is adopted; then they move gradually to point C, arriving there
at time T . Finally, they move to the old steady state SS0.
This analysis of the subsidy has several implications. First, temporary
subsidy rises abatement investment. Second, comparing figures 3 and 5
emerges that q rises less than it does if the increase in subsidy is perma-
nent, so that investment responds less. Finally, figure 5 shows that the path
of A and q crosses the locus A˙ = 0 before it reaches the old saddle path.
Therefore, abatement capital stock begins to decline before temporary sub-
sidy return to initial level (along the old saddle path). Indeed, when only
a brief period of high subsidy remains, the society finds optimal to reduce
investment immediately since it is too costly to adjust capital stock later.
Therefore, the main outcome of our analysis is that the temporary sub-
sidy does not change the long-run equilibrium of the economy. In addition, it
is not just current subsidy, but its entire path over time that affect abatement
investment and capital (and respectively waste accumulation). Finally, the
comparison of permanent and temporary subsidy shows that abatement in-
vestment is higher when subsidy is expected to be higher in the future than
when it does not. Thus, expectations of high subsidy in the future raises
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Figure 5: The effect of a temporary increase in subsidy
current abatement investment, reducing waste accumulation.
4.2 The effects of taxes
An environmental tax is often proposed as a way to attain waste targets.
In most countries, the dominant method to control waste accumulation has
been the use of direct controls over polluters, as consumers are in our setup.
But, in the present model waste accumulation will also depend on the shadow
value of abatement investment and the internalized externality caused by the
(positive) accumulated effect of defensive capital goods.
4.2.1 Socially optimal tax
As said above, equations (15) and (17) give the shadow net price µ of the en-
vironmental resource X in terms of consumption and abatement investment.
It is useful to rewrite these equations as
µ = λ(1 + h) + aα
(
XC
)α−1
(32)
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and
µ =
ψ
1 + ǫXE
(33)
They state that the gross price µ of the environmental resource X equals
the social cost of waste plus the private marginal utility of consumption;
and that the gross price µ must equal the net private value of abatement
investment, including the adjustment cost, derived from an additional unit
of capital goods. Or, more simply, the marginal social value of environmental
resource X in its alternative forms must be equated so that
ψ
1 + ǫXE
= λ(1 + h) + aα
(
XC
)α−1
(34)
It will be convenient to rearrange equation (34) to
λ =
ψ − aα
(
XC
)α−1 (
1 + ǫXE
)
(1 + h) (1 + ǫXE)
< 0 (35)
We can read this equation saying that in a perfectly functioning market,
where social costs and benefits are internalized in market process, the gross
price of waste λ (Pigovian tax) depends on several different components: the
private shadow value ψ of abatement investments; the disutility of consump-
tion −aα
(
XC
)α−1
; the environmental efficiency of the technology hXC pro-
ducing consumption goods; and the additional environmental cost
(
1 + ǫXE
)
of producing the abatement capital. Therefore, we can interpret λ as the
socially optimal tax which brings market price of waste into line with the
optimal social allocation of resources. Note that if damages and benefits are
not internalized, the price λ is not efficient and the intertemporal allocation
of the resources is suboptimal.
Recall, however, that the system (31) provides the steady state of waste
price, in terms of its social cost. Hence, our model implies that in the long
run equilibrium it must be satisfied the condition
λ ≡ −
gγMγ−1
(r + v)
=
ψ − aα
(
XC
)α−1 (
1 + ǫXE
)
(1 + h) (1 + ǫXE)
(36)
This condition states that any variations of the parameters in condition (36)
causes a reallocation of the environmental resource X between consumption
and abatement goods, shifting the economy towards the new long-run equi-
librium. Therefore, equation (36) is a necessary condition for the optimal
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solution of our waste problem. The value of λ depends on some parameters.
Note that if h = a = ǫ = 0, the previous formula reduces to λ = ψ. To
understand the meaning of this equality recall that ψ is the shadow price of
abatement capital. Thus, it quantifies the amount of social utility gains when
a unit of environmental resource is diverted from polluting consumption to
defensive expenditure. Finally, note that any changes of the magnitude of
the parameters in equation (36) affects the optimal value of taxation λ. Our
model can be used to investigate this matter.
4.2.2 A permanent rise in tax
For simplicity, assume that the tax λ rises permanently. The q value is not
affected by a change of λ. But, equation (16) states that an higher λ increases
the social charge for waste emissions, boosting society to reduce consumption
and the use of the input XC (recall λ < 0 and (α− 1)−1 < 0). Obviously,
from the constraint (12) XE must increase. The most noteworthy feature of
this change is the following: when the tax λ is high the level of abatement
capital A will be high as well, but the waste stockM will be (relatively) low.
Likewise, when the tax λ is low the abatement capital A will be low as well,
and the waste stock M will be (relatively) high. This may seem puzzling:
society holds a large amount of abatement capital when waste is low. We
call this miss-allocation of the environmental resource X as environmental
dynamic inefficiency. To see this possibility as simple as possible, look at the
graph in figure (6). Note that the net effect of a rise of tax λ is to decrease
the q value, rising the capital stock A in the long run.
4.2.3 A temporay tax
Now, consider a temporary rise of tax λ and its effect on waste. The initial
effect of this change is to shift, in the phase space (M,λ) , the demarcation
line λ˙ = 0 on the left. In addition, from the previous section we know
that an increase of λ rises XE reducing the marginal value of the abatement
investment, so changing the saddle path which converges to the equilibrium.
But, when an increase in tax is known to be temporary, it is also known that
the system will return to its initial path at some later time T. An example
of this dynamics is illustrated in figure 7.
The temporary increase of a corrective tax causes waste stock to fall
to a point where the dynamics of M and the tax λ bring them back to
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Figure 6: A permanent change in tax
the old saddle path just as the variation of tax expires. Then, they will
move up that saddle path back to the initial steady state SS0. As the figure
7 shows, λ does not fall all the way to its value on the new saddle path.
Therefore, a temporary change of λ decreases the social cost of waste less
than a comparative permanent tax does. The reason is that because the
temporary tax does not lead to a permanent decrease in consumption, it
causes a smaller reduction in the social cost associated to the existing waste
stock.
Finally, note that the figure (7) shows that under the temporary tax,
the social cost λ of waste is rising in the later part of the period that the
increase of tax is in effect, even when waste is decreasing. Therefore, after
a point, the corrective tax leads to a growing social cost and, eventually, to
a growing waste accumulation as abatement capital stock begins to decline
before corrective tax returns to normal. In other words, society anticipates
that future tax will decrease, rising future consumption. As before, this result
implies that it is not just current environmental tax, but its entire path over
time that affects waste and investment accumulation.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a control problem of waste emission and abate-
ment investment with fixed environmental resources. The innovative view of
our model is that abatement capital is assumed to enter the welfare function
as a public good, contrasting the disutility provided by the waste emissions
(public bad). Therefore, the intertemporal maximization of welfare requires
a social price to be associated with defensive capital, and a social cost to
be associated with waste flow. The interrelation between the shadow prices,
the social discount rate, the biological decay rate and the depreciation rate
determine the optimal allocation of environmental resources over time.
Our model has a special property: the use of subsidies to promote abate-
ment investment, and the introduction of corrective taxes to reduce waste
emissions may have ambiguous effect on the allocation of natural resources.
Indeed, in response to subsidies or taxes a society might accumulate less
abatement capital than desidered, allowing the stock of waste to rise in the
long run. In addition, as we have shown, the adoption of either temporary
subsidies or temporary corrective taxes do not change the long-run equi-
librium of the economic—biological system. Indeed, it is not just current
subsidies or taxes, but their entire path over time that affect abatement in-
vestment decisions and waste accumulation. Thus, expectations about how
long the subsidies and taxes would last have a special role in affecting defen-
sive investment decisions and waste accumulation.
Traditionally, the control of waste and the accumulation of abatement
capital goods use as device a system of Pigouvian prices. Our problem pro-
vide “user” charges which should redirect natural resources and its uses to-
wards the alternative activities chosen optimally by the society. A socially
optimal tax is derived as the solution of the intertemporal problem. As it
is shown, the gross price of waste λ depends on the private shadow value
of abatement investment, the disutility of consumption, the efficiency of the
technology to produce consumption goods, and the non-linear factor compo-
nent which strengthens the ability of abatement investments to absorb waste
emissions. However, as it is clear from our previous discussion, changes of
the “user” charge influence not only the accumulation of waste, but also the
dynamic of the abatement investment through the marginal q (λ) value of
capital which is directly affected by the cost of waste. Hence, one important
implication of our model is that waste accumulation and its social cost affect
the optimal pattern of the abatement investment, altering its marginal value
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through the attributed social taxes.
Based on these considerations, the public bad problem of waste accumu-
lation is actually much more complex than the way it is usually presented.
Therefore, we believe that the issues raised in this paper need to be taken
into account to provide a comprehensive analysis of the intertemporal prob-
lems related to waste emission and alternative resource uses. In fact, from
our analysis it is apparent that the difficulties in designing environmental
policies to defend environment and welfare are immense.
The present model is not conclusive, but it opens new perspectives con-
cerning the efficient and optimal use of natural resources. The next step
would be to introduce irreversibility and uncertainty. Further, abatement
capital stock may be heterogeneous or located in such a way that costs may
differ for different kind of stocks. Finally, the adjustment cost may be a
logistic curve with an upper ceiling. Each of these issues can contribute to
generalize the basic framework.
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